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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the impact of Central Bank Independence (CBI) on average inflation 
and inflation variability for 22 transition economies over the time period of 1991-2003. We devise a 
new index to represent actual CBI rather then legislative independence. The empirical evidence 
suggests that Central Bank Independence lowers both average inflation and inflation variability.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the impact of the central banks institutional reforms in the transition 
economies from Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of the Independent States on 
the inflation performance. This issue has been examined in details in the advanced economies 
however no firm relationship between central bank designs and inflation performance has been 
found in developing and transition economies. 
The newly established central banks in transition economies followed the monetary design of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). This has become particularly evident in the middle and late 1990s 
when most of the legislative reforms resulted in increased independence of the central banks from 
the central governments.  
The rationale behind this trend of increased CBI is multi-fold: for some transition economies it 
stems from their desire to join the European Union and the acquis communautaire that should be 
adopted by the applicant countries. Another incentive comes from the International financial 
institutions, e.g. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where loans are 
conditional unless the necessary criteria are met. National governments, on the other hand, to better 
demonstrate the progress of the conducted reforms in the country are likely to use the CBI to signal 
foreign investors the nation’s creditworthiness to potential investors. Following Maxfield (1997) 
the above stems from: (i) the larger their country’s need for balance of payments support, (ii) the 
greater the expected effectiveness of signalling, (iii) the more secure the tenure of the politicians, 
and (iv) the fewer their country’s restrictions on financial transactions. 
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive measurement of CBI in transition economies which 
reflects the idiosyncrasy of the economies in question. Second, it aims to measure the impact of 
CBI on inflation performance (average inflation and inflation variance). 
The rest of the paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 looks at the prerequisites for CBI 
in transition economies and compares the legislative design of the central banks with the Statute of 
the ECB. It shows that following the legislative approach towards the CBI, all the transition 
economies in this sample, with a few exceptions, have highly independent central banks. It provides 
a discussion of the institutional reforms in twenty-two transition economies. The sample covers all 
the Central and East European countries (CEE) except Yugoslavia and Montenegro and several 
countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
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Section 3 outlines the need for new index to quantify CBI and it introduces the index proposed. 
Comparisons between different CBI indices used in transition economies are made. The results and 
the empirical part are presented in Section 4 where we investigate the hypothesis that the CBI can 
explain the behaviour of inflation and the variability of inflation in transition economies. Finally 
Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2. Institutional Developments in Transition Economies 
The constitution of the Bundesbank, which gave the design of the ECB, was widely used as a model 
for designing the new central banks in most of the transition economies. The Bundesbank provided 
the practical example of an independent central bank that maintained low average inflation during 
the post-war period1. Another rationale of having an independent central bank, as mentioned earlier, 
stems from the desire of the applicant country for an earlier accession to the EU. The section below 
compares the legislative framework of the central banks in transition economies with the Statute of 
the ECB aiming to capture the legislative similarities between them. It thus attempts to outline the 
causes behind the deficiency of the indices based on the legislative approach per se when applied to 
measure the CBI in transition economies. 
2.1 Central bank independence as a legislative provision in transition economies 
The literature on CBI is related to the work of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985), arguing 
that central governments are tempted to ‘sacrifice’ long-term welfare for sake of short-run political 
gains. Therefore establishing a politically independent central bank is a prerequisite for lower 
average inflation. In line with these studies, Alesina and Grilli (1992) show, that following Rogoff’s 
delegation (1985), the European median voter has an incentive to appoint central bankers who are 
more ‘inflation-averse’ than are the voters per se. In line with the above, the Maastricht Treaty 
granted the ECB with a degree of independence widely regarded as comparable to the Bundesbank. 
Article 108 of the Treaty declares that:  
 
‘… neither ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision 
making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, 
from government of a Member State or from any other body’. 
                                             
1 Broadly referenced is the Swiss Bank, which similarly to the Bundesbank is highly independent and has maintained very low 
average inflation. 
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In addition, the acquis communautaire of Stage 2 of the European Monetary Union, which must be 
adopted by new member states required:  
‘… Central Bank independence, co-ordination of economic policies, and adherence 
to the relevant provisions of the 'Stability and Growth Pact'. New member states will 
have to forego any direct central bank financing of public sector deficits as well as 
privileged access of public authorities to financial institutions.’2  
 
The independence of the central bank is therefore stated in the legislative provision in almost all the 
transition countries participating in this survey. Countries with sooner accession have greater 
incentives to grant their central banks with greater independence. Specific aspects of the legal 
independence are explored in the sections below. 
2.2 Autonomy of the monetary policy formulation 
Following Grilli et al. (1991), the political independence of the central bank relates to its ability to 
choose autonomously objectives and make decisions on monetary policy. The statute of the ECB 
only allows a member of the European Commission to participate, without having voting or veto 
rights, in meetings of the General Council3. Furthermore, the statute does not envisage a formal 
approval of monetary policy. Seventeen transition economies’ banks (out of 22) in this study report 
that there has not been any interference from central government in formulation of monetary policy 
and only eleven banks state that there is not governmental or political control of the central bank’s 
budget. 
Attaining monetary policy autonomy depends on the term of office of central bankers, which must 
be sufficiently long to avoid the patronage involved in renewal of the term of office. The Executive 
Committee of ECB is appointed for as eight-year period of time. In our opinion the actual term of 
office is not important provided it is longer than the maximum term of office of the central 
government. The term of office of the central bank governor exceeds the longest of the central 
government in nineteen countries (except for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina4 and 
                                             
2 European Commission, Agenda 2000, Supplement 13/97, p.44. 
3 General Council is constituted as a third decision-making body of the ECB, comprised by the President, Vice president and the 
Governors of the national central banks (Chapter IX, Art. 45 of the Protocol on the Statute of European System of Central Banks and 
the European Central Bank). 
4 The central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a very unusual case. It operates as Currency Board Arrangement and 
according to the charter, the Governor for the first six years must be a foreigner. The appointment is by the Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund with the approval of the Presidency. 
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Kazakhstan). Regarding the term of office of the Bank’s Board, this principle is kept in sixteen 
countries. The term of office in transition countries in our sample varies between five and eight 
years5. 
Another important feature is whether there are non-completions of the term of office of the central 
governor. Cukierman (1992) uses the turnover rate of central bank governors as a proxy for actual 
independence. His presumption is that a higher turnover of central bank governors indicates lower 
CBI. Thirteen transition countries in this sample report one or more non-completions of the term of 
office of their central bank governors. 
However, this question allows different interpretations and the practices of different countries’ 
banks provide interesting examples. Quite unique is the case of the Czech National Bank (CNB)6. 
Officially the Bank’s governors have not completed their mandates as governors and as such no one 
ended the term of office in advance or being released by the government or Parliament. Drawing 
upon the CNB Act it is the president only empowered to dismiss governor and the CNB board 
members. However, the reality behind is rather different: in fact, there has been one governor only, 
Mr. Josef Tosovsky, since 1990. From January 1990 to December 1992 he headed the central bank 
of former Czechoslovakia, so he finished his office in advance (the term of office was 6 years) 
because of the split of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1992. He was then re-appointed for another six 
years by the president as a governor of the newly established CNB. In December 1997 he resigned 
due to the political turbulences in Czech Republic to take the post of a prime minister of the so-
called "non-political" or "bureaucratic" government, replacing Vaclav Klaus in his office. The CNB 
was without governor from January 1998 until July 1998. Following the early elections in June 
1998, when social democrats came to power, Tosovsky has been appointed as the governor again 
(since July 1998).    
                                             
5 It used to be eight years term of office in Romania, but with the recent amendments it was reduced to 6 years. 
6 The author is indebted to Pavel Soukup for his interesting comments on the independence of the Czech National Bank. 
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2.3 Objectives  
The rationale of a single policy objective instead a plurality of objectives is to eliminate the scope 
for central governments to interfere with demand for short-run objectives aiming at short-run output 
before election period. The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), as 
stated in Article 105 of the Treaty, is to maintain price stability. Article 14 of the Treaty obliges the 
member states to ensure that the statutes of its national bank are compatible with the provisions of 
the Treaty. This resulted in reforms that started in central banks’ statutes across the European Union 
(EU) member-states as well as in the associate members from Central and Eastern Europe. This 
tendency is revealed by the legislative amendments to the central banks’ charters in transition 
economies like Hungary (1996), Czech Republic (with the 1995 amendment), Poland (1997), 
Bulgaria (1997) and others. Nearly all CEE countries have closely modelled their legislation on the 
ECB and there are many legislative similarities. Regarding the primary objective, with a few 
exceptions (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Estonia), the transition economies in this sample chose the 
maintenance of price stability. Least is the bank’s independence with regard to the autonomy of the 
Bank’s budget, which is a subject of political or governmental control, which is the case for half of 
the banks in our sample. 
2.4 Financing the Central Government 
This section concerns the economic independence of the central bank (as formulated by Grilli et al. 
(1991), i.e. the ability of the central bank to choose the monetary instruments in pursuing its goals 
without government interference.  
The most significant constraint is with regard to the use of monetary policy instruments related to 
financing the public deficit. Article 21.1 explicitly prohibits the ECB from participating in the 
primary market for public debt as well as any type of credit facility ‘in favour of Community 
institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies 
governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States’. However, eleven countries’ 
banks only in this sample do not provide advances for financing the central government and thirteen 
central banks do not participate in the primary market for public debt. 
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2.5 Banking supervision 
According to its Statutes the ECB is not envisaged to play an important supervisory role. Just two 
central banks in our sample (Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina) have separate agencies for 
prudential supervision of the financial institutions. However there is not a consensus in the 
economic literature whether the central bank should be involved in the commercial banks’ 
supervision. Some economists believe that, as long as the central bank is acting as a lender of last 
resort, supervision should be entrusted to the central bank. Landau and Garber (1992) argue that if 
the central bank is lending to credit institutions, it should be responsible for the commercial banks' 
supervision. The rationale for this is that by delegating to the central bank a supervisory and 
regulatory role, it can accurately assess the solvency of eventual borrowers thereby defending its 
own interests.  
Interference in the lender of last resort function of the central bank is an important aspect of CBI, 
especially in countries engaged in the privatisation of the banking sector or in countries where the 
banking sector is dominated by the state. In the face of a liquidity crisis, many transition 
governments are unwilling to allow state banks to go bankrupt, particularly if those banks are on the 
privatisation list. In countries retaining a major state banking sector, there is even less chance that a 
bankruptcy could take place. Most of the transition countries experienced such interference during 
the banking crises in the middle and late 1990s (early 1990s for Poland and the Baltic States, 1997 
for Bulgaria, etc.). The central bank then had to refinance the banks with liquidity problems at the 
cost of its anti-inflationary stance. More than one third of the countries in our sample indicated 
interference in the lender-of-last-resort function. 
Summarising the sections above, the transition economies have fully embraced the current western 
approach and provided their central banks with considerable legislative independence from the 
central government. Many governments in transition economies are trying to fulfil the requirements 
imposed by the international institutions in order to obtain debt rescheduling, further loan facilities 
or/and sooner accession to the EU. Some governments in transition economies used to refer to 
decrees to oblige their central bank to absorb excess supply of government securities, although this 
may be in an explicit conflict with the central bank constitution. To demonstrate how successfully 
the economic transformation is progressing, the legislative system of the country is perfectly 
reflecting the recommendations given by international institutions, but in practice the parliament (or 
government) in the respective country used to issue ‘other law’ or decree which was applied when 
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the existing legislation was not appropriate for the goals of the government, examples of which are 
provided below. 
In conclusion, the transition economies in this sample have central banks with very high legislative 
independence. On the other hand, the evidence from these countries suggests that their central 
banks often are pressed to follow instructions given by the government although they conflict the 
existing legislation. Therefore, in some countries, the legislative independence, taken on its own, 
does not reveal the true picture. 
3. New CBI Index 
The index introduced in this paper is broadly modelled on the one introduced by Grilli et al. (1991) 
but modified to capture the idiosyncrasy of transition economies. Most of the research on CBI in 
transition economies has been done during recent years. Dvorsky (2000) in her study on five CEE 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) updates the governors' 
turnover rate estimates of Radzyner and Riesinger (1997), aiming to measure the actual 
independence. Given the short period of observation (eleven years) the author warns that the 
estimates should be treated with caution. The countries in this sample show extremely low turnover 
rates (e.g. Slovenia is below the lower threshold, which is 0.25). The author concludes that the 
governors' turnover rate (introduced as a proxy for actual independence in developing countries by 
Cukierman 1992, p.383) does not reflect the actual CBI in transition economies. Earlier studies, 
such as Loungani and Sheets (1997), discovered an inverse relationship between their CBI index 
and the average inflation in 1993. 
More light has been shed by the recent publications of Cukierman et al. (2000), Maliszewski (2000) 
and Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000). The latter authors examined the central banks' statutes in ten 
CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia and Slovak Republic) which except for Romania have adapted their legislation to 
resemble the one of the European Central Bank (ECB). Furthermore, the analysis of the CEE 
countries' central banks in question shows that the democratic accountability is comparable to the 
one of the ECB. In line with Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000), Cukierman et al. (2000, p. 10) extend 
the CBI study on 26 transition economies and conclude that "the levels of their legal independence 
are substantially higher, on average, than those of developed economies during the eighties".  
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Second, the indices used in the literature were designed for OECD countries and do not capture the 
picture in transition and developing economies. Referring to section two of this paper, transition 
economies have fully applied the legislation of the EU economies whereas the central bank practice 
there suggests that the rule of law is arguably observed. The section below introduces a new index 
of CBI, which aims to deal with limitations of previous indices when applied in non-OECD 
countries. 
The assumption made when constructing the CBI index was that the legislative and actual 
independence might diverge when there are traditions in the country with the power of legislation, 
or existence of other legislation, which may conflict the central bank charter. These two aspects of 
CBI were taken into account when attempting to measure it. Furthermore, the understanding of the 
respondents is checked whenever possible and this is done by employing a triangulation technique.  
3.1 Structure of the new index 
The index provided in this section is structured into five categories: (i) objectives and policy 
formulation; (ii) appointments of the governor and board of the central bank; (iii) legislation and 
tradition; (iv) the banking sector; and (v) financing the government. The questions provided in each 
category approach the issues of independence from both a legislative and behavioural perspective. 
There is an attempt by the new indices to embrace the recommendation of Elgie and Thompson 
(1998) to allow comparisons to be made ‘across time and across countries’. 
The issues covered in the new CBI index are described below. 
Objectives and policy formulation: 
(i) The objectives of each central bank are of key importance for its overall performance.  Price 
stability as a sole objective of a bank is given priority by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. 
(1992) indices (respectively GMT and CWN) and is the major objective of the European Central 
Bank (ECB).  This objective is also embedded in the legislative amendments of many central 
banks’ charters in transition economies like Hungary, the Czech Republic (with the 1995 
amendment), Poland (1997), Bulgaria (1997), Romania (1995) and others. 
 
The reason for having one clearly identified objective instead of a plurality of objectives is to 
eliminate the possibility of governments intervening to exploit short-run trade-offs between 
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inflation and growth (or unemployment) before elections. Goodhart (1994) suggests that having 
price stability as a single objective may also reduce conflict between central banks’ officials and 
monetarists over the most appropriate operational techniques. 
(ii) Autonomy of the policy formulation is another key feature of independent central banks. 
The five-year period chosen in this index is more or less the average term of office of governor or 
board. The rationale of selecting a certain period is that the maximum terms of office in different 
countries varies from country to country and it is usually from three to eight years. The last question 
in this cluster traces presence of governmental or political or other forms of control over the budget 
of the central bank. This issue has proved to be crucial for the Czech National Bank, where the 
independent budget of the Bank has been continuously debated in the Parliament. However, the 
suggested amendments in the Bank's charter, envisaging government's control over the Bank's 
budget, were finally overruled by the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic June 2001 as not being 
in line with the Constitution of the country. The second point traces for evidence of actual 
interference in the policy formulation coming from the government. Thus the score is based on 
what has actually happened rather than what is stated in the legislation. 
Appointments: 
(i) Issues related to appointments have been well outlined in GMT and CWN indices. Provided 
the term of office is longer than five years (as required in the GMT index) or eight years (CWN 
index), it does not necessarily mean that it is longer than the maximum term of the government.  
The more important issue is not the actual term of office of the governor and central bank board, but 
whether it exceeds the maximum term of office of the government and therefore the new indices 
highlight this aspect of the terms of office.  
(ii) There is a possibility that some of the important issues related to the central bank are stated 
not in the central bank charter, but in the constitution of the country or elsewhere and this may 
constrain the freedom, initially granted to the central bank. This concern becomes relevant in cases 
when dismissal of the Bank's governor is in question (as in the described by Cukierman (1992) case 
with the Governor of Bank of Argentina). 
 
(iii) The bodies making the appointments for the positions of governor and board members must 
be clearly identified. Legally the appointments may come from the parliament/congress, but at the 
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same time it could be the government, as the only body entitled to nominate names that the 
parliament or the bank later approve. For instance, the governor of the Romanian central bank was 
legally elected by the parliament over the past few years even though it was the Prime Minister who 
nominated candidates to take this post. Independence is clearly maximised when the appointments 
of the governor and central bank board are made within the central bank, which on the other hand 
has been widely criticised as undemocratic act, allowing concentration of much power into a hand-
full of non-elected bureaucrats. 
(iv) The governor should not hold an office outside the central bank (governmental or political) 
that might affect his/her decisions with regard to the management of the bank.  The final issue 
covered in this cluster, looks whether there are government representatives present on the Bank's 
board, irrespectively whether they are with or without voting and/or veto rights.  
Legislation and tradition 
There are several ways to overrule the central bank law, the most common amongst them is the 
power of traditions, which conflict the existing legislation, alternatively the same can be achieved 
by a parallel law dealing with the same matters as the Bank's charter. Thirdly, by change in the 
legislation per se, when the existing charter is no longer convenient for the Chief Executive. And 
finally - not as common as the above - direct breaches of the Bank's legislation by the Chief 
Executive. 
Elster (1979, p.93) argues that the “rule of law”, following Max Weber and others, and a “stable 
institutional framework” are essential for a growing economy, mainly because of the ability to 
predict. There are two sources of uncertainties about future decisions stemming mainly from two 
sources: ambiguous law or constantly changing law. The latter outlines the need for constant law as 
far more essential than the need for just a law. 
(i) The changeable nature of the legislation or the “rule of law” in transition economies is an 
important issue, which has not been captured by the existing indices. The more changeable the 
legislation, the less the scope for the central bank to behave independently in monetary policy 
making (See Table 1 for details). The recent amendments in the legislation of the central banks in 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania are indicated in the table below, suggesting the 
constancy of law in the studies transition economies is far below the desired one.  
Table 1: Recent Amendments of Central Bank Law in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and 
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Romania 
Country Amendments 
Bulgaria 
State Gazette 50/91 
State Gazette 32/96 
State Gazette 46/97 
Czech Republic 
Act No.130/1989 
Act No. 22/1992 
Act No.  6/1993 
                 1995 
Poland 
Act No. 9, 30/06/95 
Act No.47, 25/02/92 
                  04/04/97 
Romania 
Law No.34, 1991 
Rule No.3, 07/95 
1999 
Source: Bulgarian State Gazette 46, 1997; Cerna, S., Donath, L. and B. Dima (1999), ‘Central Banking in 
Transition Economies: the Case of Romania’; Huterski, R., Nicholls, R. and Z. Wisniewski (1999), ‘Central 
Bank Independence in Poland’; Soukup, P., Taci, A. and R. Matusek (1999), ‘Central Bank Independence 
and Macroeconomic Performance in the Czech Republic’ in ‘Central Banking in Transition Economies’ 
(Eds: Healey, N. and Z. Wisniewski), Torunska Szkola Zarzadzania, Torun.  
 
(ii) Traditions in some transition and developing economies may be as important as the 
legislation per se, however they are not part of the legislation and therefore are not captured by 
previous indices. Sometimes they may conflict with the existing legislation ad hoc affecting the 
legislatively based independence of the central bank. This appears to be amongst the main causes 
for the gaps between formal and actual independence. The well-known case of the Central Bank of 
Argentina, described by Cukierman (1992), provides a good illustration of how central bank charter 
can be overruled by the power of traditions. 
(iii) The existence of other laws in a country, interfering with the central bank charter, are 
broadly associated with the economic transition of Eastern Europe and the CIS. The Bulgarian 
central bank provides a unique case during the period preceding the introduction of a currency 
board arrangement (1990 - 1997). Although independence was guaranteed by the bank's charter, the 
government used to refer to the annual law for the budget, and supported by the parliament, it 
obliged the central bank to absorb the excess supply of long-run securities. This problem is present 
when the government wants to show to the public and international institutions lower inflation 
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commitment, and equally, it is not ready to give up the old ‘habits’, which assured easy money 
access. Alternatively parallel legislation may result from the pressure for change coming from 
international institutions for which the government is not prepared.  
Many governments in transition economies are trying to fulfil the requirements imposed by the 
World Bank and IMF in order to obtain debt rescheduling or further loan facilities. Thus to 
demonstrate how successfully the economic transformation is progressing, the legislative system of 
the country is adjusted according to the recommendations of the international institutions. In reality, 
there used to be in power ‘another’ law, which was applied when the existing legislation was not 
suitable enough for the goals of the government. 
The banking sector  
(i) The relationship between the central bank and the commercial banks is important in terms of 
the independence. The latter is higher when the central bank is not involved in supervision of the 
commercial banks. Historically, it is linked with the lender-of-last resort function of the central 
bank, which is a guarantee for the well being of the individual commercial banks acting as a lender-
of-last-resort. This role was performed in various ways in the different countries. In some countries 
like Germany and Switzerland where the Bank was publicly found the banking supervision was 
entrusted to a separate body outside the CB and hence it was not entitled with being the lender-of-
last resort. In other countries, like England, France, Italy and others, where the bank was found with 
private shareholders’ capital, the bank was entitled with the role of lender-of-last-resort and 
respectively with the commercial banks’ supervision. 
(ii) Government interference in the bank’s lender-of-last-resort function is mostly associated 
with transition countries privatising the banking sector or state enterprises.  In the face of a liquidity 
crisis, many transition governments are unwilling to allow the state bank to declare bankruptcy, 
particularly if the state bank is on the privatisation list.  In countries retaining a major state-owned 
banking sector, there is even less probability that a bankruptcy would take place.  Most of the CEE 
countries experienced such interference during the banking crisis in 1993 and 1996. The central 
bank then had to refinance the banks with liquidity problems, at the cost of its anti-inflationary 
stance. 
Financing the Government 
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(i) This section mainly looks at facilities that the central bank provides when financing the 
central government.  Independence is best served when automatic advances to the government are 
not permitted, the terms of lending are under the control of the Bank and it does not participate in 
the primary market for public debt. 
The new index detailed in this section is presented in the appendix. The coding technique employed 
in this study differs from the techniques used in previous CBI indices. Each question is equally 
weighted to reflect the critiques raised by Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Mangano (1998) 
regarding the weighting spread, i.e. the extent to which the final value of the index is affected by 
the weight attributed to each individual criterion. Furthermore, this index is based on the 
assumption that the more criteria that are met by the respective central bank, the more independent 
it is according to this index, whereas the criteria included in the weighted indices bring different 
scores. 
The questions covered in the index are ticked in a manner to demonstrate absolute independence 
(see Appendix for further details). 
Table 2 below compares three CBI indices for transition economies. Although the Cukierman 
(1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) weighted index of legal independence (LVAW) and our index 
report the same average CBI, there are significant differences for some countries. A possible 
explanation could be the changeable nature of the legislation in transition economies (it is one of 
the criteria, included in the new index) and different authors have been referring to the legislation in 
different years. However, the most feasible explanations stems from the selection of different 
criteria, chosen by different authors, (i.e. the criteria spread) which were included in the index. 
The highest is the average CBI reported by the GMT index 12.37, which is difficult to compare 
with the other indices because of the different metric system employed. However, this result is 
consistent with the results from our pilot study, showing that the legislative approach per se 
overstates the actual CBI in transition economies (valid for developing countries too in the eighties 
(Cukierman et al. (1992) and Cukierman (1992)).  
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Table 2: CBI in 22 Transition Economies (2000) 
 
No. Country LVAWa Grilli et al.b CBI 
1 Albania 0.51 12 (0.71) 0.48 
2 Armenia 0.85 14 (0.82) 0.52 
3 Azerbaijan 0.25 N/a N/a 0.39 
4 Belarus 0.73 11 (0.65) 0.43 
5 Bulgaria 0.55 15 (0.88) 0.61 
6 Croatia 0.44 11 (0.65) 0.52 
7 Czech Republic 0.73 13 (0.76) 0.65 
8 Estonia 0.78 13 (0.76) 0.65 
9 Georgia 0.73 13 (0.76) 0.7 
10 Hungary 0.67 10 (0.59) 0.7 
11 Kazakhstan 0.44 N/a N/a 0.48 
12 Kyrgyzstan 0.52 15 (0.88) 0.7 
13 Latvia 0.49 12 (0.71) 0.65 
14 Lithuania 0.78 15 (0.88) 0.7 
15 FYROM 0.41 14 (0.82) 0.74 
16 Moldova 0.73 13 (0.76) 0.74 
17 Mongolia 0.55 N/a (N/a) 0.43 
18 Poland 0.89 14 (0.82) 0.72 
19 Romania 0.34 7 (0.41) 0.61 
20 Russia 0.49 11 (0.65) 0.52 
21 Slovak Republic 0.62 11 (0.65) 0.57 
22 Slovenia 0.63 11 (0.65) 0.7 
 Average CBI 0.6 12.37 (0.73) 0.6 
      Notes: 
         a Data obtained from Cukierman et al. (2001) 
      b Data obtained from Maliszewski (2000) 
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Using the index introduced in this study, the average CBI in transition economies is comparatively 
high (0.6). This is mainly evident in the CEE countries and stems from the acquis communautaire, 
which must be adopted by the new member states aiming membership to the EMU. However some 
patterns within the transition economies can be detected. Highly dependent are the banks in the CIS 
countries, (e.g. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan) participating in our survey. On the other hand, 
the CEE countries planning sooner accession to the European Union have highly independent 
central banks.  
4. Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Transition Economies 
The average annual inflation in transition economies has marked a significant decrease in the mid 
1990s compared to the start of the reforms in the early 1990s. Meanwhile the CBI, arguably, has 
been the sole cause for the inflation developments. This section empirically tests the impact of CBI 
on average inflation and inflation variability of 22 transition economies over the time period of 
1990-2003.   
4.1 Inflation Developments in Transition Economies 
As previously mentioned, the empirical evidence for OECD countries suggests a negative 
relationship between the CBI and the average inflation. The nature of inflation in transition 
economies is far more complex and many factors, besides CBI, can significantly influence it, which 
makes the investigation of the relationship a difficult task. Maliszewski (2000) outlines that a main 
cause for the high inflation in Eastern and Central Europe is the monetary expansion driven by 
political factors.   
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4.2 Central Bank Independence and Average Inflation in Transition Economies 
4.2.1 Data Definitions 
The Inflation Variable (I) 
To reduce heteroscedasticity of the error term and improve the efficiency of the model, a 
transformation of the inflation variable was adopted. The new variable ,I  represents the annual real 
depreciation of a given amount of money, which is given by:  
( )1I
π
π= +           (1) 
Where π  is the inflation rate and I  is the transformed inflation rate (taking values from 0 to 1). 
Data on end-year inflation is obtained from the 2003 EBRD Transition Report. The data set 
comprises of 22 transition economies over the time period of 1991-2003.7  
The transformed inflation variable I  takes values between 0 and 1 and consequently is bounded by 
definition. In order to reinforce this point, we undertake the recently proposed unit root test by Ng 
and Perron (2001) for the variable I over a panel consisting of 22 countries and 13 years. The 
results of the unit root test can be seen in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Unit Root Test for The Transformed Inflation 
 
Ng- Perron Test Statistic Asymptotic Critical Value 
-8.23 -8.1 
Notes: 
The Asymptotic Critical Value for the Ng-Perron Test Statistic is given at the 95% level of 
significance. 
                                             
7 The 22 transition economies used in our sample can be seen in Table 2. 
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We are able to accept the hypothesis that the transformed inflation is stationary at the 95% level of 
significance.  
Central Bank Independence Variable (CBI) 
The CBI variable for the 22 countries between the time period of 1991-2003 was obtained with the 
use of the survey discussed previously.  
Cumulative liberalization Index (CLI) 
Cukierman et al (1998) find some evidence of a moderating effect on limitations on lending on 
inflation in their study. This result, however, is obtained without conditioning on the CLI. 
Maliszewski (2000) finds that the more advanced transition economies tend to have stricter 
limitations on lending. This leads to the conclusion that the coefficient of CBI may be biased if the 
CLI is not included in the model. Therefore we include CLI as an explanatory variable. The data for 
the CLI index is obtained from Cukierman et al (1998).   
IMF Dummy (IMF)  
We include a step dummy that is equal to 1 in the year of signing the IMF standby agreement and 
after and equal to 0 otherwise. This dummy accounts for the effect of the externally conditionality 
on policy performance and is constructed from the dates of IMF agreements in IMF (1998). 8 
Government Deficit Financing (DEF) 
To test for the significance of government deficit financing, the general budget government deficit 
is also added to the regression model. The series is constructed using the data present in the 2003 
EBRD Transition Report. 
Rouble Zone (RZ) 
A step dummy for countries participating in the rouble zone is added. The dummy is equal to 1 
before the country adopts its own currency and equal to 0 afterwards. For non-FSU countries the 
dummy is always equal to 0. The dates of adopting national currencies are obtained from Lybek 
(1999).  
                                             
8 For more details of the construction of the IMF dummy variable see Maliszewski (2000).  
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From the above discussions our adopted linear specification is of the form: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it itI CBI CLT IMF DEF BZβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +     (2) 
Where itI  is the transformed inflation for country i at time period t. itCBI  is the Central Bank 
Independence Index for country i at time period t. itCLI  is the Cumulative liberalization Index for 
country i at time period t. itIMF  is a dummy that is equal to 1 in the year of signing the IMF 
standby agreement and after and equal to 0 otherwise. itDEF  is the general budget government 
deficit for country i at time period t. itBZ  is a dummy that is equal to 1 before the country adopts its 
own currency and equal to 0 afterwards. 1β  is a constant and itε  is a random error term which is 
distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a variance of 2.σ  The results can be seen in Table 3.9  
Table 3: Central Bank Independence and Average Inflation 
1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it itI CBI CLT IMF DEF BZβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
 
Time 
Period 
N 1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  6β  2R  
1991-
2003 
286 0.83(0.13) 
6.39* 
-
0.03(0.014) 
-2.15* 
-
0.09(0.015)
-6.21* 
-
0.21(0.07)
-3.03* 
0.31(0.07)
4.44* 
-
0.22(0.08)
-2.76* 
0.74 
Notes:  
Standard errors are shown in brackets and t statistics are shown in bold. In order to account for 
possible serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problems in the error term we estimated serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for panel data models as suggested by 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  
* denotes significance at the 95% level of significance.  
                                             
9 Since we are estimating a Panel regression we have to either estimate a fixed effects or random effects model. Our choice is based 
on the Hausmann (1978) test. When we apply this test we obtain a test statistic of 4.74 with a corresponding p value of 0.3149. This 
leads us to conclude that the random effects model is the optimal econometric model. We therefore proceed and estimate the random 
effects model. 
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The critical values at the 95% level of significance for the t statistics were obtained from an 
empirical distribution with the use of 1000 trials and were found to be equal to 1.89 and –1.82.  
From Table 3 we can see that 2R  is high indicating that 74% of the variation of the transformed 
inflation can be explained by the variation of the explanatory variables. We can also see that all the 
explanatory variables are statistically significant with the expected signs. As central banks become 
more independent inflation is lowered. This is apparent whether we use the CBI or the CLI indices 
to represent the CBI.  Inflation decreases after introducing IMF programmes and after adopting 
‘own currency’, and inflation increases with a greater government deficit. Our results agree with 
both Cukierman et al (1998) and  Maliszewski (2000).10 
4.3 Central Bank Independence and Inflation Variability in Transition Economies 
Variability of inflation imposes economic costs. In fact many of the costs of high inflation arise 
because it is usually more variable and uncertain when the average inflation is high. Based on the 
previous discussion we would expect the transformed inflation to be less volatile as the central 
banks become more independent. It is therefore important to investigate whether our proxy for CBI 
actual affects the variability of inflation.  
As a measure of inflation variability, we calculate the standard deviation of  
2
it itSD d d⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦           (3) 
 
Where id  is the transformed inflation of country i at time period t.  
 
We investigate CBI and the variability of inflation by estimating the following econometric model: 
                                             
10 Previous studies (see among others Cukierman et al (1998) and  Maliszewski (2000)) have estimated dynamic panel data models 
to encounter possible endogeneity problems of the explanatory variables. Dynamic panel data models were estimated and the results 
remain the same. The results (not reported) are available upon request. The model presented in equation (2) was preferred because it 
had a higher 2 .R   
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1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it itSD CBI CLT IMF DEF BZβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +     (4) 
Where the variables are defined as previously. The results can be seen in Table 4.11  
Table 4: Central Bank Independence and Inflation Variability 
1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it itSD CBI CLT IMF DEF BZβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
Time 
Period 
N 1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  6β  2R  
1991-
2003 
286 1.45(0.16) 
9.05* 
-
0.04(0.011) 
-3.62* 
-
0.06(0.019)
-3.16* 
-
0.17(0.02)
-8.49* 
0.24(0.04)
6.00* 
-
0.18(0.09)
-2.01* 
0.36 
Notes:  
Standard errors are shown in brackets and t statistics are shown in bold. In order to account for 
possible serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problems in the error term we estimated serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for panel data models as suggested by 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  
* denotes significance at the 95% level of significance.  
The critical values at the 95% level of significance for the t statistics were obtained from an 
empirical distribution with the use of 1000 trials and were found to be equal to 1.92 and –1.87.  
From Table 4 we can see that the 2R  is quite low and indicates that the proposed model can explain 
only 36% of the variation of the standard deviation of the transformed inflation.  However, the 
model appears to perform well when confronted with data since all the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant with the expected signs. As central banks become more independent 
inflation is lowered which in turn reduces the variability of inflation. This is evident whether we use 
the CBI or the CLI indices to represent the CBI.  Inflation decreases after introducing IMF 
programmes and after adopting ‘own currency’, which reduces inflation variability. Finally 
inflation increases with a greater government deficit which consequently increases the variability of 
inflation.  
                                             
11 The Hausmann (1978) test gives a test statistic of 4.82 with a corresponding p value of 0.3723. This leads us to conclude that the 
random effects model is the optimal econometric model. We therefore proceed and estimate the random effects model. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recent empirical studies have used various indices to quantify CBI in transition economies 
(Loungani and Seets, 1995, Cukierman et al. 2000, Maliszewski 2000, etc). The indices used give a 
very good illustration of the legislative CBI, which as discussed in this paper, diverges from the 
actual independence. The authors provide comparison between the legislative design of the central 
banks in 22 transition economies and the design of ECB, which shows the transition economies 
have modelled their banks on the ECB charter. A close inspection of the practices of the studied 
central banks shows interference from central government in monetary policy formulation, 
appointments to the central bank board and terms of lending to central government. A new index of 
CBI is therefore introduced aiming to provide a more comprehensive measure the actual 
independence of central banks in transition economies. 
The impact of the CBI (represented by the newly constructed index) on average inflation and 
inflation variability is tested empirically for 22 transition economies over the time period of 1991-
2003, with the use of panel data estimation with robust standard errors. As previous studies we find 
that CBI lowers both average inflation and inflation variability. The high (r bar squared), the 
significance of the explanatory variables and the robust standard errors imply that this is an 
important empirical result.   
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Appendix: Central Bank Independence Index and Coding Technique 
A) OBJECTIVES AND POLICY FORMULATION 
1. Is the price stability the major and/or only objective of the Central Bank?    
2. Has there been any Government interference in formulation of the monetary policy within the last 5 
years?            
3. Is there any Government or political control of the Central Bank’s budget?    
B) APPOINTMENTS 
4. Is the Central Bank Governor appointed by the Government?      
5. Is there legislative provision for dismissal of the Governor?      
6. Can the Central Bank Governor hold governmental or political office?    
7. Does the Central Bank Governor's term of office exceed the maximum term of the Government? 
             
8. Does the Central Bank's Board office exceed the maximum term of the Government?   
9. Are there any appointments to the Central Bank Board made by the Government?   
10. Are there any Government representatives attending Central Bank Board meetings with/without 
voting/veto rights?           
11. Does the Government consult (e.g. nominates candidates) the bodies appointing the Governor and the 
Central Bank Board?           
12. Have there been any non-completions of the Central Bank Governor(s) term of office within the last 
ten years?            
C) Legislation and tradition 
13. Has the Central Bank legislation been changed within the last 5 years? (if yes, which year)  
14. Has the Central Bank legislation been breached within the last 5 years?    
15. Are there any ‘other laws’ (in the country) that conflict with the Central Bank Constitution (evidence 
of breaching the Central Bank charter within the last 5 years)?        
16. Are there traditions that interfere with the Central Bank Charter (e.g. Central Bank Governor or/and 
Board Members resigning with change of the Government)?      
17. Are there provisions, which strengthen the Central Bank's position in case of conflict with the 
Government?           
D) THE BANKING SECTOR 
18. Is the banking supervision entrusted to the Central Bank?      
19. Is the banking supervision entrusted to the Central Bank alone?     
20. Has there been Government or political interference in fulfilling/not fulfilling the ‘Lender-of-last-
resort’ function of the Central Bank for the last 5 years?      
E) FINANCING THE GOVERNMENT 
21. Are advances permitted when financing the Government?      
22. Are terms of lending controlled by the Central Bank or Bank charter when financing the Government?
               
23. Does the Central Bank participate on the primary market for public debt?      
24. Overall Central Bank Independence        (23) 1.00 
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Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies 
No. Country Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Total (%)
1 Albania 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.48 
2 Armenia 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.52 
3 Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.39 
4 Belarus 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.43 
5 Bosnia and
Herzegovina 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.7 
6 Bulgaria 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.61 
7 Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.52 
8 Czech R. 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.65 
9 Estonia 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.65 
10 Georgia 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.7 
11 Hungary 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.7 
12 Kazakhstan 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.48 
13 Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.7 
14 Latvia 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.65 
15 Lithuania 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 0.7 
16 FYROM 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.74 
17 Moldova 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.74 
18 Mongolia 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.43 
19 Poland 1 1 0.5 1 0 1 1 0.5 1 0 1 0.5 0 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1 0.72 
20 Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.61 
21 Russia 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.52 
22 Slovak R. 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.57 
23 Slovenia 0.5 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.7 
1 Some central banks have given more than one response, and then the average weight of the given answers is shown. Respectively 1 and 0 indicate 
whether the CBI criterion is met or not. 
